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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
be able to force partition of those interests.17  Had the court
recognized that holding in common referred to elements of own-
ership, the plaintiff would have been able to partition the entire
property since his interest in perfect ownership gave him ele-
ments in common with all co-owners including the usufructuary.
It is submitted that Louisiana courts should adopt the ele-
ment approach to holding in common. Partition is the most
logical solution to the intolerable management problems which
can arise when perfect owners and usufructuaries, each with
equal rights to use the property, 8 cannot agree as to the man-
ner in which the property is to be utilized. Under the element
criterion either the perfect ownership or usufructuary could
force partition of the usufruct. It is true that under the code
provision the same right of partition could not be denied the
naked owner even though there is no compelling management
consideration. In answer to the countervailing consideration
that perfect owners should not be forced to dismember their
titles, it may be observed that a perfect owner who desired to
avoid the dismemberment of his title resulting from partition
of the usufruct and naked ownership alone would be afforded
ample protection by his right to reconvene against naked own-
ers and usufructuaries for a partition of the entire property.
The French adoption of the element interpretation of holding
in common clearly indicates that this approach is available
under the Louisiana code provision.19 It is submitted that the
necessity for partition to resolve management conflicts makes
it clearly desirable that Louisiana adopt the concept that those
who possess the same elements of ownership hold in common.
Charles A. Snyder
CIVIL LAW PROPERTY- TACKING WITHOUT JURIDICAL LINK
Plaintiff sought to be declared owner of a 38-acre tract of
land by thirty years acquisitive prescription. His father ac-
17. See notes 9 and 11 supra.
18. The perfect owners, through LA. CIVIL CODE art. 491 (1870), and the
usufructuary, through id. art. 533, have the right to enjoy the full use of the
property to the extent of their interest.
19. But cf. id. art. 1303. An argument is also possible, though not accept-
able to the author, that the provision in id. art. 1309-"Thus, usufructuaries
of the same estate can institute among themselves the action of partition"-
is the only manner in which the usufructuary is able to partition, and thus is
a specific rejection of the element criterion.
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NOTES
quired McManor Plantation by sale in 1920 and possessed as
owner the now disputed 38 acres adjacent to McManor until his
death in 1937. The succession judgment awarded one-third of
the plantation to the plaintiff's mother and two-thirds to the
surviving eight children. Plaintiff continued his father's pos-
session of the disputed acreage, thus preserving his own and
his coheirs' rights. He acquired his coheirs' interests in Mc-
Manor by sale and donation in 1945 and continued possession
of the disputed property. Plaintiff claimed ownership of the
entire 38 acres by virtue of tacking his coheirs' interests in his
father's possession to his own one-twelfth interest. The plea of
prescription, sustained below, was rejected by the court of ap-
peal for lack of juridical link between plaintiff and his coheirs."
The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed. Held, the general de-
scriptions of the property conveyed in the 1945 transactions
were sufficient to permit tacking of possession although the
disputed acreage was not mentioned therein, nor included within
the specific descriptions of the property conveyed.2 Noel v.
Jumonville Pipe & Machinery Co., 158 So. 2d 179 (La. 1963).
The Civil Code allows the adverse possessor to add the pos-
session of his author in title to his own possession in order to
complete the prescriptive period.3 According to the jurispru-
dence, the possession of a transferor may be joined to that of
his transferee only if the transferor's interest is conveyed by
an instrument translative of title. This joinder of separate
possessions is called tacking.4 An heir acquires the succession
1. Noel v. Jumonville Pipe & Machinery Co., 148 So. 2d 891 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1962).
2. Id., 158 So. 2d 179, 186 (La. 1963) : "While the property which forms the
subject matter of this suit is not specifically described in any of the transactions
hereinabove recited, nevertheless, the property which was intended to be trans-
ferred and which was actually transferred and delivered is described as 'a certain
sugar plantation known as McManor Plantation, situated in the Parish of Ascen-
sion, . . .' which in fact included the property in controversy."
3. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3493 (1870) : "The possessor is allowed to make the
sum of possession necessary to prescribe, by adding to his own possession that
of his author, in whatever manner he may have succeeded him, whether by an
universal or particular, a lucrative or an onerous title." Article 3493 is identical
with article 2235 of the French Civil Code. 3 LOUISIANA LEGAL ARCHIVES,
COMPILED EDITION OF TILE CIVIL CODES OF LOUISIANA, 1916 (1942) ; LA. CIVIL
CODE art. 3494 (1870).
4. See, e.g., Stutson v. McGee, 241 La. 646, 130 So. 2d 403 (1961) ; Buckley
v. Catlett, 203 La. 54, 13 So. 2d 384 (1943) ; Harang v. Golden Ranch Land &
Drainage Co., 143 La. 982, 79 So. 768 (1918) ; Sibley v. Pierson, 125 La. 478,
51 So. 502 (1909) ; Hadwin v. Sledge, 116 So. 2d 114 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1959) ;
Roberson v. Green, 91 So. 2d 439 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1956) ; Courvelle v. Eckart,
50 So. 2d 325 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1951) ; 1 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE (AN
ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY THE LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE) nos. 2673,
2678 (1959) ; Comment, 8 LA. L. REV. 105-07 (1947).
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of the deceased by operation of law.5 It is clear from the Code
and jurisprudence that he merely continues the possession of
his ancestor and does not commence a new and separate pos-
session of his own.0 Therefore, the heir does not tack his in-
dependent possession to that of his ancestor, but simply con-
tinues the same possession the deceased commenced. 7 When the
deceased leaves several heirs, they become owners in indivision8
and possession by one coproprietor is possession on behalf of all.9
Well-established jurisprudence supports the proposition that
when one possesses beyond the description in his deed but sells
only by the deed, the vendee cannot tack his adverse possession
to his vendor's for prescriptive purposes because there is no
privity of contract or juridical link'0 as to the adversely pos-
5. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 940, 941 (1870).
6. Id. art. 942: "The heir being considered seized of the succession from the
moment of its being opened, the right of possession, which the deceased had,
continues in the person of the heir, as if there had been no interruption, and
independent of the fact of possession." Id. art. 943. See, e.g., Lee v. Harris, 209
La. 730, 25 So. 2d 448 (1946) ; LeBleu v. Hanszen, 206 La. 53, 18 So. 2d 650
(1944) ; Spencer, Adm'r v. Lewis, Adm'r, 39 La. 316, 1 So. 612 (1887) ; Griffon
v. Blanc, 12 La. Ann. 5 (1857) ; A. M. Edwards Co. v. Dunnington, 58 So. 2d
225 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1952) ; Chrichton v. Krouse, 142 So. 635 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1932); 1 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE (AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY
THE LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE) nos. 2661, 2674 (1959); Comment, 8
LA. L. REV. 105, 107-09 (1947).
7. See note 6 supra. Tacking results when two or more separate possessions
are joined together to complete the prescriptive period. A possessor by particular
title commences a new and separate possession of his own and does not continue
the same possession his author in title commenced. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 3493,
3494 (1870). Article 3493 was article 3459 in the Code of 1825. It is the exact
counterpart to article 2235 of the FRENCH CIVIL CODE. 3 LOUISIANA LEGAL
ARCHIVES, COMPILED EDITION OF THE CIVIL CODES OF LOUISIANA 1916 (1942).
See, e.g., Stutson v. McGee, 241 La. 646, 130 So. 2d 403 (1961) ; Hadwin v.
Sledge, 116 So. 2d 114 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1959) ; Roberson v. Green, 91 So. 2d
439 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1956); 1 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE (AN ENGLISH
TRANSLATION BY THE LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE) nos. 2673, 2678 (1959);
Comment, 8 LA. L. REV. 105, 109-12 (1947).
8. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1292 (1870).
9. Succession of Seals, 243 La. 1056, 150 So. 2d 13 (1963) ; Lee v. Jones,
224 La. 231, 69 So. 2d 26 (1953) ; Sanders de Hart v. Continental Land & Fur
Co., 205 La. 569, 17 So. 2d 827 (1944) ; Hill v. Dees, 188 La. 708, 178 So. 250
(1937) ; Liles v. Pitts, 145 La. 650, 82 So. 735 (1919) ; Watkins v. Zeigler, 147
So. 2d 435 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1962) ; British American Oil Producing Co. v.
Grizzaffi, 135 So. 2d 559 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1961).
10. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 3493, 3494 (1870). Louisiana jurisprudence
adopted the following definition of privity from 1 R.C.L. 718 (1914) : "Privity
denotes merely a succession of relationships to the same thing, whether created
by deeds or by other act, or by operation of law. If one by agreement surrenders
his possession to another, and the acts of the parties are such that the two pos-
sessions actually connect, the latter commencing at or before the former ends,
leaving no interval for the constructive possession of the true owner to intervene,
such two possessions are blended into one. ... In Stutson v. McGee, 241 La.
646, 659, 130 So. 2d 403, 407 (1961), while interpreting the application of the
above quoted definition in the Harang and Rector cases, the court said: "As we
read this definition in connection with the observations of the Court in the men-
tioned two cases, as well as with the authorities therein cited, it is clear to us
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sessed property.1 ' Furthermore, the courts hold that when the
general and particular description in a deed conflict, the par-
ticular description prevails. 1 2
In the instant case, the Supreme Court speaks in terms of
plaintiff tacking his possession to his father's adverse posses-
sion.13 The term tacking supposes two or more separate pos-
that the reference to 'other act' . . . was intended to mean 'other instrument',
such as an act of donation (as opposed to a deed), not merely to the 'actions'
of parties." E.g., Emmer v. Rector, 175 La. 82, 143 So. 11 (1932) ; Harang v.
Golden Ranch Land & Drainage Co., 143 La. 982, 79 So. 768 (1918) ; Richey v.
Hill, 84 So. 2d 291 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1955); Merritt v. Smith, 35 So. 2d 817
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1948) ; Ford v. Ford, 34 So. 2d 301 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1948).
11. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 3493, 3494, 3500 (1870). See Stutson v. McGee, 241
La. 646, 130 So. 2d 403 (1961) ; Thurman v. Hogg, 225 La. 263, 72 So. 2d
500 (1954); Buckley v. Catlett, 203 La. 54, 13 So. 2d 384 (1943); Emmer v.
Rector, 175 La. 82, 143 So. 11 (1932); Opdenwyer v. Brown, 155 La. 617, 99
So. 482 (1924) ; 1 R.C.L. 720 (1914) is quoted in Harang v. Golden Ranch Land
& Drainage Co., 143 La. 982, 1019, 79 So. 768, 780 (1918) : "'Several successive
possessions cannot be tacked for the purpose of showing a continuous adverse
possession, where there is no privity of estate or connection of title between the
several occupants.' " In the landmark case of Sibley v. Pierson, 125 La. 478, 514,
51 So. 502, 514 (1910) the court held: "[A]nd such vendee cannot, for the pur-
pose of aiding himself in the acquisition by prescription of property not included
in his title, add his vendor's possession to his own, there being no privity between
him and his vendor in that respect." Prevost's Heirs v. Johnson, 9 Mart.(O.S.)
170 (La. 1820); Hadwin v. Sledge, 116 So. 2d 114 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1959);
Isacks v. Deutsch, 114 So. 2d 746 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1959). In Roberson v.
Green, 91 So. 2d 439, 447 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1956) the court said: "There was
no privity of estate nor of contract between the Bettells and their predecessors
in title inasmuch as the deeds of conveyance, . . . specifically described the prop-
erty conveyed and did not include a description of any portion of the disputed
tract." A factual situation quite similar to the instant case is found in Finley
v. Morgan, 80 So. 2d 196, 198 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1955), in which the court said:
"Inasmuch as in defendant's deeds to the adjoining property no reference is made
to the property possessed beyond such instruments, there is no privity of contract
between plaintiff and his vendors." Richey v. Hill, 84 So. 2d 291 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1955) ; Sattler v. Pellichino, 71 So. 2d 689 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1954) ; Cour-
velle v. Eckart, 50 So. 2d 325 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1951) ; Lee Lumber Co. v.
Melcher, 43 So. 2d 632 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1950); Beam v. Dudding, 43 So. 2d
73 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1.949) ; Merritt v. Smith, 35 So. 2d 817 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1948) ; Ford v. Ford, 34 So. 2d 301 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1948) ; Blades v. Zinsel,
130 So. 199 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1.930) ; Broussard v. Broussard, 8 La. App. 635
(1st Cir. 1928) ; McEvoy v. Porbes, 1 Orl. App. 56 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1903) ;
1 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE (AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY THE LOUISIANA
STATE LAW INSTITUTE) nos. 2673, 2678 (1959); The Work of the Louisiana
Supreme Court for the 1960-1961 Term -Prescription, 22 LA. L. REV. 326, 329
(1962); Comment, 8 LA. L. REv. 105, 107 (1947).
12. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1945 (1870). In Snelling v. Adair, 196 La. 624, 635,
199 So. 782, 785 (1941), the court quoted from 72 A.L.R. 410 (1931) and said:
"It is the general rule that: 'Where a particular and a general description in a
deed conflict, and are repugnant to each other, the particular will prevail unless
the intent of the parties is otherwise manifested on the face of the instrument.' "
See Iselin v. C. W. Hunter Co., 173 F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 1949) ; Arab Corp. v.
Bruce, 142 F.2d 604 (5th Cir. 1944) ; Bender v. Chew, 129 La. 849, 56 So. 1023
(1911) ; Sabatier v. Bowie Lumber Co., 129 La. 658, 56 So. 628 (1911) ; Fortier
v. Soniat, 143 So. 2d 91 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962) ; Properties, Inc. v. Beckman,
77 So. 2d 161 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1955).
13. 158 So. 2d at 184: "From the above law and jurisprudence, we are im-
pelled to conclude that 'privity' existed between Robert E. Noel and his children
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sessions which are joined together to complete the prescriptive
period. 14  Since the heir simply continues the same possession
the deceased commenced,' 5 it would seem that the term tacking
should not be utilized to describe this continuance of possession,
but should be reserved for situations in which two or more sep-
arate possessions exist.'6
More significantly, plaintiff was allowed to tack his coheirs'
possessory interests to his own. Although the disputed acreage
was not included in the specific descriptions of the 1945 con-
veyances, nor mentioned in the general descriptions, the court
construed the deeds so to include the 38 acres in the general
descriptions of the property transferred. 17  If, as appears to be
the case, the conveyances did not purport to transfer an interest
in the disputed property, there should be no tacking since there
was no juridicial link between the transferors and the trans-
with respect to the possession of the disputed property, and they were entitled
to join their possession to that of their ancestor." (Emphasis added.) Reference
to the father as ancestor in the preceding passage leads one to believe the court
is again referring to the father as ancestor in its statment, id. at 186: "Frank S.
Noel is entitled to tack his possession to that of his ancestors and authors in
title." (Emphasis added.) The dissent, id. at 188, refers to plaintiff's inheritance
of possession from his father as follows: "[A]nd, by tacking his father's pos-
session to his own .... ." (Emphasis added.)
14. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3493 (1870). See, e.g., Stutson v. McGee, 241 La.
646, 130 So. 2d 403 (1961) ; Hadwin v. Sledge, 116 So. 2d 114 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1959) ; Roberson v. Green, 91 So. 2d 439 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1956) ; 1 PLANIOL,
CIVIL LAW TREATISE (AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY TIE LOUISIANA STATE LAW
INSTITUTE) nos. 2673, 2678 (1959) ; Comment, 8 LA. L. REV. 105, 109-12
(1947).
15. See note 6 supra.
16. In Griffon v. Blanc, 1.2 La. Ann. 5 (1857) the court, in reference to the
successor's position, quoted from Marcad: " '[I]n spite of their personal good
faith, they are possessors in bad faith, if their author was in bad faith, and vice
versa. They have no new title.' " Planiol says: "If the deceased being in good
faith, had a right to prescribe in from ten to twenty years, his heir may complete
the prescriptive period within this delay, although he personally was in bad faith.
On the contrary, if the deceased, being in bad faith, could not prescribe except by
thirty years, his heir will be in the same position even if he personally is in good
faith." 1 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATsE (AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION RY THE
LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE) no. 2674 (1959); Comment, 8 LA. L. REV.
107-09 (1947). In other words, if the ancestor dies as a bad faith possessor, his
heir cannot prescribe in ten years, even though he is a good faith possessor. le
continues the same possession the deceased commenced and must wait thirty years.
Tacking supposes a new and separate possession from that of one's predecessor.
If tacking were used to describe the continuance of possession by the heir, a
fortiori, the heir as a good faith possessor could prescribe in ten years even though
his ancestor would have been forced to wait thirty years. This would seem to be
an incorrect result.
. 17. 158 So. 2d at 186: "While the property which forms the subject matter of
this suit is not specifically described in any of the transactions hereinabove re-
cited, nevertheless, the property which was intended to be transferred and which
was actually transferred and delivered is described as 'A certain sugar plantation
known as McManor plantation, situated in the Parish of Ascension, ... ' which
in fact included the property in controversy."
NOTES
feree.' 8 It was well settled prior to the instant case that re-
gardless of the vendor's interest in the adjacent property,
whether it be perfect ownership or merely adverse possession,
the vendee could acquire the vendor's rights to the property
unless the terms of the deed included such property.19 Even if
the disputed acreage could be said to have been included within
the general description, "McManor Plantation," it seems there
still should be no tacking for when general and particular de-
scriptions in a deed conflict, it is well established that the par-
ticular description prevails. 20 It would seem to follow that had
the court adhered to the code provisions and jurisprudence, 21
it would have held that the 1945 transactions had no effect on
the disposition of the disputed acreage. If this conclusion had
been reached, it appears that the plaintiff's interest in the ad-
verse possession of the disputed property would not have ex-
ceeded the undivided one-twelfth interest which he inherited
from his father; and he, at best, would have been declared
owner of only this undivided one-twelfth interest in the prop-
erty by thirty-years acquisitive prescription. 22
It is submitted that the Jumonville decision is not in accord
with the code provisions or jurisprudence of this state. For
tacking, the jurisprudence requires a deed translative of title
which purports to convey the transferor's interest in the ad-
versely possessed property to the transferee. It would seem that
if the deed does not include an adequate description of the prop-
erty allegedly tacked, it should at least include some reference
to or mention of the property in question. It appears that the
deeds relied upon in the instant case did not include the ad-
versely possessed property; if so, it is doubtful that these deeds
were translative of title and that tacking could oocur.
Gordon E. Rountree
18. See note 11 supra.
19. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 3493, 1945 (1870). See, e.g., Stutson v. McGee, 241
La. 646, 130 So. 2d 403 (1961) ; Richardson & Bass v. Board of Levee Commis-
sioners of the Orleans Levee District, 226 La. 761, 77 So. 2d 32 (1954) ; Pierce
v. Hunter, 202 La. 900, 13 So. 2d 259 (1943). In Snelling v. Adair, 196 La. 624,
640, 199 So. 782, 787 (1941) the court said: "It is the settled jurisprudence of
this state that a deed, in order to be translative of title to real estate, must con-
tain such a description as to properly identify the property." Hunter v. Forrest,
195 La. 973, 197 So. 649 (1940) ; Bendernagel v. Foret, 145 La. 115, 81 So. 869
(1919).
20. See note 12 supra.
21. See note 11 supra.
22. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 3652 (1960) in part says: "A petitory
action may be brought by a person who claims the ownership of only an undi-
vided interest in the immovable property or real right."
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